Consider this sentence:
PN PN is probably not true.
Sentences can be true even if they’re
probably not, at least on some readings of ‘probably’. I’m intending ‘probably’
in one of those ways. It sounds Moore-paradoxical to say ‘P but probably
not-P’, but Moore-paradoxicality isn’t inconsistency. So the instance of the
sloppy T-schema for PN...
T-PN PN is true iff PN is probably not true.
...doesn’t entail a contradiction. Maybe it’s
true but probably not true. Contrast the instance of the sloppy T-schema for L:
L L is not true.
T-L L is true iff L is not true.
T-L does entail a contradiction, so L is
paradoxical. T-PN doesn’t, but that’s not the end of it. First, note that
there’s another way PN could go: it could be untrue though not probably. This
might be because it was probably true, or because its truth and untruth were
equiprobable. So it might be true, and it might be untrue. Which is it?
A fairly reasonable-sounding principle of
indifference might say its truth and untruth were equiprobable. In that case it
isn’t probably untrue, which means it isn’t true. But if the equiprobability
was itself probable, then its consequence that PN isn’t true would seem to be
probable, which means PN is true, which is a contradiction. So the
equiprobability isn’t probable. What are the other credible options?
Maybe PN is probably not true. But this means
it’s true. So if PN is probably probably not true, then it’s probably true.
That doesn’t sound a very delicious combination.
The other possibility is that PN is probably
true. In that case it’s not true. So if it’s probably probably true then it’s
probably not true. Yuk again.
Can this lot even be made consistent? Here
are the entailments:
Probably true → untrue
Probably not true → true
Equiprobable → untrue
If the disjunction of probably and equiprobable
is probable, then PN is probably untrue, but this contradicts the disjunction
being probable, since the options are exclusive. So the disjunction is not
probable, so probably not must be at least 50% probable. But if it’s
exactly 50% probable, then given the entailments, PN is equiprobably true and
not true. But this makes equiprobable true, which we’ve established is
not probable. So suppose probably not is probable. This means PN is
probably true, which is a contradiction. So the improbable equiprobable must
be true. But if something must be true, then it’s probable. So the disjunction
is probable after all, and that led to a contradiction. So dialetheism must be
true. But if dialetheism must be true, we can reject some of the above reductio
reasoning. So some contradictions are true, but possibly not this one.
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